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Abstract 
In network markets, the provision of third-party converters is an important dimension of standards wars. In this paper, 
we develop a mathematical model to analyze the effects of third-party converter introduction on the adoption process of 
incumbents’ base technologies and discuss managerial insights based on our model. We determine converter introduction 
strategies of third parties by establishing under what circumstances third parties may maximize their profit. We find that 
there exists an optimal introduction time for converters, which depends on a trade-off between conversion option and 
consumers’ memory effect. The preferred conversion option is mostly two-way conversion. As a result of converter 
provision, converter introduction affects the de facto standardization process of the incumbents’ base technologies by 
accelerating the lock-in process of the dominant technology. We then discuss how incumbents can anticipate and react to 
third-party converter introduction in order to reduce the third parties’ incentive to introduce converters. Throughout 
the paper, we illustrate our analytical results with numerical examples.  
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1. Introduction 
In markets with network externalities – network mar-
kets – a persistent challenge is the management of com-
peting technology standards to win battles for 
technological dominance. While the most prominent 
example of a standards war has probably been in the 
video recorder market between VHS and Betamax, 
there has also been a format war in almost each storage 
medium: floppy disks, mini-disks, memory cards, DVDs 
and more recently high-definition DVDs. 
In this context, scholars have identified that one way to 
interconnect incompatible technology networks is the 
provision of conversion technologies (e.g., Gabel, 1987; 
Shapiro and Varian, 1999b; David and Bunn, 1988). For 
example, Microsoft agreed with its rival Novell on de-
veloping technologies that allow users to run both the 
Windows and Linux operating systems on the same 
computer (Ryst, 2006). Furthermore, technology digita-
lization nowadays simplifies and speeds up the develop-
ment of conversion technologies. That is, new standards 
wars are more likely to end up with conversion being 
offered rather than being fought out until “the end.” 
In light of the implications of converter provision on de 
facto standardization processes, incumbents’ concerns 
to allow for potential converter introduction are legiti-
mate. However, some “market spoilsports” – say third 
parties – may also play a major role in standards battles 
by providing converters to the market. For example, in 
instant messaging technologies, there have been at-
tempts to bridge the major instant messengers net-
works – like AOL, MSN, Yahoo or ICQ – with 
programs called Trillian (see Viard and Fan’s, 2005 case 
study) and more recently Universal Messenger Plus. 
Similarly, in the ongoing war in the voice over IP (VoIP) 
industry, there exists a program called PSGw which 
allows Skype users to communicate with other VoIP 
networks like Apple iChat or Windows Live Messenger. 
In the digital audio industry, there exists software, like 
Blaze Media Pro, to convert Apple’s audio protected 
files to MP3 or WMA so that they can be played on a 
music player other than iPod. More recently, Apple’s 
encryption technology has been “reverse-engineered” 
to ensure interoperability between iPod and competi-
tors’ devices (Levine, 2006). A company, Doubletwist 
Ventures, has been founded to license this conversion 
technology. Finally, in the browsers war between Fire-
fox and Internet Explorer, it is possible to read “Inter-
net Explorer only” sites in Firefox using a program 
called IE Tab. 
Hence, while converter introduction may change the 
rules of standards battles, third-party provision of con-
verters is another dimension that incumbents of such 
battles have to consider. Given the business at stake, 
the need of incumbents to anticipate and react to the 
introduction of third-party converters is self-evident. 
Yet, this topic has received relatively little attention. In 
this paper, we focus on incumbents facing third-party 
converter introduction. We develop mathematical 
models to capture the time dynamics of technology 
adoption for base technologies and converters alike. In 
particular, we address the following research questions: 
1. Which strategies follow third parties to intro-
duce converters between incompatible tech-
nologies? 
2. What are the effects of third-party converters 
on the adoption process of competing base 
technologies? What are the implications on in-
cumbents in terms of creating the market and 
fighting in de facto standardization processes? 
3. Under what conditions do incumbents have to 
anticipate third-party converter introduction 
and how should they best react to it? 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, we review the relevant literature. In Section 
3, we describe our mathematical models for the adop-
tion of base technologies and third-party converters. In 
Section 4, we analyze implications of third-party conver-
ter introduction into the market and discuss managerial 
insights based on our models. We investigate converter 
introduction strategies of third parties by determining 
under what circumstances they can maximize their prof-
it. We find that there exists an optimal introduction 
time for converters, which depends on a trade-off be-
tween conversion option and consumers’ memory ef-
fect. Third parties favor two-way conversion as 
conversion option and situations in which both base 
technologies enter the market at the same time. From 
the incumbents’ perspective, converter introduction 
affects the de facto standardization process by accelerat-
ing the lock-in process of the dominant technology. Not 
only does this introduction have negative effects on 
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weak incumbents (loss of time to re-position), it also 
impacts dominant incumbents (loss of time to upgrade 
or develop new products resulting in sales loss). We 
then discuss which tactics can be used by the incum-
bents to anticipate or react to converter introduction, 
in order to reduce the third parties’ incentive to intro-
duce converters. In Section 5, we summarize key find-
ings and provide direction for future research. 
2. Literature Review 
We analyze the effects of third-party converters intro-
duced in network markets. We build on the literature 
on competing standards in the presence of network 
externalities, which has been extensively reviewed by 
Farrell and Saloner (1987), David and Greenstein 
(1990), Swann (2000) and Blind (2004), among others. 
An increasing stream of this literature is dedicated to 
technology conversion and has pointed out the impor-
tance of conversion from a strategic perspective. Devel-
oping converters between incompatible technologies 
has indeed been considered as a means to achieve com-
patibility in fighting standards battles (Braunstein and 
White, 1985; David and Bunn, 1988; Katz and Shapiro, 
1994; Shapiro and Varian, 1999b). In this context, Farrell 
and Saloner (1992) analyze the implications of convert-
ers when there is a conflict between compatibility and 
variety. Converters may increase compatibility and so-
cial welfare only if there is no tendency for the compet-
ing technologies to standardize before converters 
become available. In addition, Choi (1996; 1997) studies 
the transition from an old technology to an incompatible 
new technology. He shows that converters can block 
the transition process to a new technology and thus 
create market inefficiencies, but improve consumer 
welfare. Likewise, Andreozzi (2004) demonstrates that 
converters do not facilitate the transition to a superior 
technology. Yet, a company could be attracted to de-
velop converters, since they can reduce the critical mass 
of its own technology while increasing the critical mass 
of the competitors’ technology. 
Conversion has also been strategically analyzed from the 
perspective of providers in terms of conversion alterna-
tives and timing of converter introduction. Manenti and 
Somma (2008) examine several conversion scenarios to 
analyze the incentives that firms face in their compatibil-
ity decisions. They find that incumbents choose to pre-
vent entrants’ technologies from being compatible, while 
entrants prefer to build a converter to benefit from 
incumbents’ installed bases. Completing the set of sce-
narios with partial compatibility and considering dynam-
ics of converter introduction, Seifert and Varé (2009) 
more recently explore effects of incumbent-provided 
converters. They show that the introduction of such 
converters may accelerate, extend or reverse the tech-
nology lock-in process. They determine that the optimal 
strategy for weak incumbents is to introduce converters 
early on, while two-way converters introduced at a later 
time are optimal for dominant incumbents. 
Besides provision by incumbents, converter provision by 
third parties has been identified as an existing character-
istic of standards wars (David, 1987; David and Green-
stein, 1990). In this regard, David and Bunn (1988) show 
that the cost of providing third-party converters may be 
influenced by the variety of technical systems that need 
to be made interoperable. From the incumbents’ per-
spective, Economides (1988) models how incumbents 
can vary their proprietary designs to affect converter 
costs faced by third parties. Likewise, Farrell and Sa-
loner (1992) suggest that dominant incumbents want 
converters to be costly to the users. However, while 
this research discusses potential suppliers’ tactics for 
varying converter costs, it does not examine implica-
tions of third-party converter introduction as such on 
the adoption process of incumbents’ base technologies. 
We consider third-party converters as complementary 
products. The literature on complementarities ad-
dresses the issue of complementary (or indirect) net-
work externalities. Consumers choose between 
incompatible technology networks on the basis of the 
software expected to be available, and the benefits for a 
hardware good arise as a function of the variety of 
complementary products (Chou and Shy, 1990; Church 
and Gandal, 1993; 1996). In particular, Economides and 
Viard (2007) evaluate the influence of network effects 
on a base good due to a complementary good. They find 
that monopolists on base, but not complementary 
goods, have an incentive to set prices low on base 
goods to attract customers who use complementary 
products, even if they are provided by competitors. In 
spite of that, this literature does not consider that com-
plementary products may have effects on several tech-
nology networks, like converters – which correspond to 
specific complementary products that may have partially 
compatible interfaces. A recent exception is due to 
MacKie-Mason and Netz (2006) who allow for one-way 
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converters (called “one-way standards”) as an anti-
competitive manipulation of interfaces between tech-
nologies such that they do not interoperate at the com-
ponent level. This analysis is restricted to one-way 
conversion – effects due to two-way conversion are not 
considered. 
In summary, we contribute to the existing literature by 
investigating converter provision by third parties and 
consumer adoption of third-party converters. Based on 
third parties’ decisions on converter introduction time 
and conversion option, we analyze the impact that such 
complementary products may have on the adoption 
process of competing base technologies and on incum-
bents’ business. 
 
3. Mathematical Models 
To address our research questions, we model the adop-
tion of two competing and incompatible base technolo-
gies A and B as well as a complementary technology, a 
third-party converter C. We consider an adoption 
process in three phases, as illustrated in Figure 1. In the 
first phase, time t ∈ [0,T), converters are not yet availa-
ble. In the second phase, time t ∈[T,tlock(T)), converters 
become available. In the third phase, t ≥ tlock(T), one of 
the base technologies has locked in the market and is 
considered as de facto standard in the market. 
We distinguish three specific elements of converter 
sales, depending on the time within the technology 
adoption process at which they are captured: converter 




Figure 1. Overview of the technology adoption process. 
In Subsection 3.1, we present the market dynamics 
during the initial phase of the technology adoption 
process, when converters are not yet available. In Sub-
section 3.2, we focus on the market dynamics from time 
T onward, once third-party converters have been made 
available. 
3.1 Initial standards war 
The market dynamics during the initial phase of the 
technology adoption process equate those of a basic 
standards war between two competing and incompatible 
technologies. They have been previously analyzed by 
multiple scholars – we consider Seifert and Varé’s 
(2009) base model of technology adoption and summar-
ize its main constructs here. 
Building on Farrell and Saloner’s (1986) economic analy-
sis of installed base and compatibility, the adoption of 
two technologies A and B is modeled. Following Lancas-
ter (1979), technology i (i ∈ {A,B}) with product charac-
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teristics θi is located on a product space segment Θ = 
[0,1]. Consumer utilities for technology i are expressed 
by ui(t) = αi + βiNi(t). Here, αi ≥ 0 represents the stand-
alone value of technology i. The strength of the network 
benefits is captured by βi ≥ 0. The size of network i at 
time t is denoted by Ni(t). Hence, βiNi(t) constitutes the 
network-generated benefits, which correspond to an 
increase in utility related to network growth over time. 
As consumers join the market with arrival rate n(t) = 1, 
the utilities change over time due to increasing network 
effects. 
Following Hotelling’s (1929) linear spatial model, prod-
uct and customer type spaces are assumed to be iden-
tical. Each customer type is presumed to have a most 
preferred product specification denoted by X ∈ Θ, X ∼ 
Uniform(0,1). If X ≠ θi, customers incur a certain disutili-
ty δi(X) = λi |θi  − X|, where λi > 0 represents the cus-
tomer preference sensitivity. 
A consumer adopts the technology for which she has 
the higher overall utility (ui(t) − δi(X)). The probability 


















=         (1) 
Equation 1 holds before market lock-in of one compet-
ing technology A or B occurs, i.e., for all t such that 
pi(t)∈ (0;1). 
Given that the number of users at time t is Ni(t) = Ni(0) 
+ τττ dpn i
t )()(0∫ , the adoption probability of tech-



























=  (2) 
The adoption probability of technology j is pj(t) = 1 − 
pi(t). 
3.2 Adoption of converters and base technolo-
gies 
In this subsection, we model the market dynamics from 
time T onward, when third-party converters C become 
available (see Figure 1). To establish the different con-
verter sales and the adoption of base technologies from 
time T, we model conditional adoption probabilities of 
third-party converters. 
Each consumer joining the market adopts a base tech-
nology A or B at time ti ≥ 0 (i ∈ {A,B}). Once converters 
become available at time T ≥ 0, all current and new 
users make a second decision on whether to adopt a 
converter C at time tC ≥ T (where tC ≥ ti). Consumers 
never buy only C. Converters are provided exclusively 
by third parties, i.e., the providers of technologies A and 
B do not introduce their own converters. 
Consumers adopt a converter C only if their utility from 
buying a converter are strictly greater than the disutility 
associated with third-party converters. 
The utility from buying a converter, Ui(tC), is composed 
of normalized utility benefits from conversion ûi(tC) and 
a network effect factor M(tC), such that Ui(tC) = 
ûi(tC)M(tC) as follows: 
The normalized utility benefits ûi(tC) represent consumer 
utility for technology i as a function of time. Once third-
party converters have been introduced to the market, 
the utility of consumers that choose to not purchase 
such a converter equates )(_ tu
Ci
 = αi + βiNi(t) + 
μjiβjNjC(t). In addition to the stand-alone value αi and the 
network-generated benefits βiNi(t), this utility now in-
cludes conversion-generated benefits for technology i-
users, μjiβjNjC(t), where μji ∈ [0,1) reflect the degrees of 
conversion. These benefits result from “receiving com-
patibility benefits” from technology j-users who bought a 
converter, NjC(t). By buying a converter, consumers of 
technology i receive compatibility from all users Nj(t) of 
the competing network. That is, consumer utilities for 
technology i and converter can be expressed as ui,conv(t) 
= αi + βiNi(t) + μjiβjNj(t), with μjiβjNj(t) being the full con-
version-generated benefits. Therefore, the benefits for a 
technology i-user of owning a converter, normalized for 
comparison purposes over the total conversion-
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The network effect factor M(tC) accurately reflects the 
scaling of the network effects. Indeed, if converters are 
one-way and/or imperfect, ûi(tC) does not completely 
comply with the principle of network effects. For exam-
ple, if converters are one-way with μij = 0 and μji ≠ 0, 
then ûi(tC) = 1. That is, the normalized utility benefits no 
longer include the network effects due to converters 
and users get the maximum possible utility from conver-
sion, independently from the respective network sizes. 













the relative network sizes over the market size at the 
present time tC and thus captures the network size ef-
fects. 
To determine the adoption probability of converters, 
we need to compare the utility from buying a converter 
Ui(tC) to the disutility associated with third-party conver-
ters. This disutility is composed of an objective part and 
a subjective part: The objective part is impacted by 
converter price PC ∈ [0,1] (normalized over a maximum 
price) and an objective quality measure QC ∈ [0,1], in-
cluding aspects such as reliability or degree of conver-
sion complying with the converter function (transfer of 
compatibility benefits). We represent this objective part 
by a parameter D such that D ≡ D(PC;QC). 
The subjective part depends on the consumer willing-
ness to buy third-party converter C, as well as by the 
delay between the decisions at times tC and ti. The con-
sumer willingness to buy a converter is represented by a 
parameter Y ∈ [0, 1]. If Y = 1, a consumer has the high-
est willingness to buy a converter. If Y < 1, the highest 
willingness is altered by a lack of acceptance. For exam-
ple, if the converter is a software product, a consumer 
might perceive that it slows performance or contains 
unwanted add-ons, spyware or even viruses – even if 
objectively speaking neither would be true. In this analy-
sis, we allow for a uniform distribution of the willingness 
to buy third-party conversion in terms of consumer 
perception, i.e., Y ∼ Uniform (0,1). 
The subjective part is furthermore impacted by the 
delay between the two decisions at times tC and ti. The 
decision delay corresponds to a memory effect: A con-
sumer entering the market at time ti < tC has less infor-
mation with respect to converter existence or less 
interest for new complementary products in the market 
than a consumer entering at time tC. Therefore, the 
lower the information or interest level, the higher the 
loss of utility associated with conversion. We model this 
decision delay by a function ψ(tC, ti) = )( iC tte −−γ , with γ 
∈ [0, 1].1 
One way to define the disutility associated with third-
party converters is thus: δ(Y, ψ(tC,ti)) = D(1 − Yψ(tC, ti)). 
This disutility function sensibly captures the objective 
effects of price and quality in relation with the subjective 
willingness and memory to buy converters. That is, for a 
user entering the market at time ti, the lower the wil-
lingness Y and the higher the disutility parameter D, the 
higher the disutility. In particular, δ(Y,ψ(tC, ti)) has been 
specified such that consumers with willingness to buy 
conversion Y = 1 and tC = ti do not incur disutility asso-
ciated with conversion. Furthermore, even if the con-
verter is free (PC = 0) and its quality is perfect (QC = 1), 
consumers with a reduced willingness to adopt conver-
ters Y < 1 and/or a decision delay (tC − ti) > 0 should 
incur disutility. Indeed, if free and perfect conversion 
software existed, users still might not want to download 
and/or install it, which often happens in reality in the 
context of third-party converter provision. 
Based on the above modeling choices, we can determine 
the conditional adoption probabilities of third-party 
converters given the use of a base technology. For an i-


























































                  (3) 
                                            
1 In marketing, there is a strong evidence of a correlation 
between forgetting and the passage of the time. For example, 
Little and Lodish (1969) have modeled the fading memory of 
consumers with an exponential time-dependent decay. 
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Note, Equation 3 holds only if ψ(tC, ti ) ≥ 1 − 
D
tU Ci )( , 
while for ψ(tC, ti) < 1 − 
D
tU Ci )( , p(C|i)(tC, ti) = 0, as the 
memory ψ(tC, ti) is so weak that no consumer adopts a 
converter at time tC. 
From this, we can consider the elements of the tech-
nology adoption with availability of converters (Figure 
1). In Subsection 3.2.1, we characterize how consumers 
who bought a base technology before T respond to 
converter introduction. In Subsection 3.2.2, we deter-
mine how each new consumer joining the market be-
tween T and tlock(T) decides on the adoption of a base 
technology and a converter. In Subsection 3.2.3, we 
describe consumer reaction to technology lock-in at 
time tlock(T). 
3.2.1 Converter introduction 
At time T ≥ 0, third-party converters C are introduced. 
We assume that all consumers who have previously 
bought a base technology now make a decision about 
buying or not buying a converter C as a complement. 
The installed bases NA(T) and NB(T) are distributed be-
tween converter adopters and non-adopters, such that 
NAC(T) and NBC(T) represent the conditional installed 
bases of converter adopters at time T. These installed 
bases are jointly defined by 
dttTptpTN
T
ACAAC ∫= 0 )( ),()()(  and 
dttTptpTN
T
BCBBC ∫= 0 )( ),()()( , respectively, with 
pi(t) being given by Equation 2. Therefore, the converter 










3.2.2 Adoption of base technologies with availability 
of converters 
In this phase of the technology adoption process (t ∈ 
[T,tlock(T))), consumers take the availability of third-party 
converters into account while choosing a base technol-
ogy A or B. To explicitly incorporate the availability of 
converters into the adoption process of base technolo-
gies A and B, we adapt Equation 1, using the utility func-
tions )(_ tu
CA
 and )(_ tu
CB
 that comprise conversion-



















, . We 
develop this expression, and determine the general 
condition for adoption of base technology i in the pres-


























As p(C|i)(t) and p(C|j)(t) depend on the installed bases Ni(t) 








dppTNtN τττ )()()()( )(,  – Equ-
ation 4 appears not to be analytically tractable. We can 
however use numerical methods to solve it and to con-
duct sensitivity analysis to determine implications of 
third-party converter introduction on the technology 
adoption process. 
Hence, we can characterize the converter post-
introduction sales. We assume that, between T and 
tlock(T), each consumer joining the market simultaneously 
decides on the purchase of a base technology and a 
converter (i.e., ti = tC). This implies ψ(tC, ti) = 1 for all ti, 






lock ttptpTS  
dtttptp BCconvB )),()( )(,+ . 
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3.2.3 Technology lock-in 
At time tlock(T), one of the base technologies wins the 
standards battle and locks in the market. The losing 
technology (technology l) gradually disappears for all t ≥ 
tlock(T) and thus no new complementary technologies are 
introduced into the losing network. The users of tech-
nology l not possessing a converter will be considered 
as “orphaned” (see Gandal et al., 1999). To avoid it, 
these users can either switch to the other network or 
buy a converter. We therefore assume that, at time 
tlock(T), these users reconsider whether they want to 
adopt or not adopt a converter C. The converter lock-
in sales in the third phase of the technology adoption 
process are expressed by  






∫ ∫ −+−=   
In this section, we developed a mathematical model for 
the adoption of third-party converters and their effect 
on the adoption of competing, incompatible technolo-
gies. We made a specific set of assumptions on objective 
and subjective consumer perception of third-party con-
verters. Our model abstractions are a first attempt to 
capture the essential trade-offs and to provide insights 
on implications of third-party converter introduction on 
the adoption process of base technologies. In the next 
section, we describe how third parties can maximize 
their profit and how incumbents can anticipate and react 
to third-party converter introduction. 
4. Managerial Insights 
In this section, we consider the interdependence be-
tween incumbents’ and third parties’ businesses. We 
address our research questions to discuss implications 
of third-party converter introduction as based on our 
mathematical model. In Subsection 4.1, we investigate 
which converter introduction strategies are followed by 
third parties. In Subsection 4.2, we analyze the effects of 
third-party converter introduction on the incumbents’ 
business. In Subsection 4.3, we present how the incum-
bents can anticipate and react to third-party converter 
introduction. 
4.1 Conversion strategies of third-parties 
We determine which strategic options can be followed 
by companies willing to introduce converters. To do so, 
we assume that such third parties try to maximize their 
profit – if third parties have a commercial interest as 
well as if they have a “revolutionary” objective (such as 
disrupting dominant incumbents in their way to lock a 
market). Assuming constant converter price and negligi-
ble marginal cost over time2, third parties maximize 
their profit if they maximize converter sales. Indeed, the 
more units third parties can sell or distribute, the lower 
the fixed cost per unit and thus the higher the profit 
margin.  





, where S(T) = SI(T) + SII(T) + 
SIII(T) is the sum of the converter introduction sales, the 
post-introduction sales and the lock-in sales. 
To maximize their sales, third parties can decide on the 
introduction time T and conversion option. We assume 
that sales can be maximized with full conversion (μAB → 
1) being offered, as the maximum conversion-generated 
benefits can be captured. We therefore consider the 
following conversion options: (1) Full two-way conver-
sion, (2) full one-way converters with conversion-
generated benefits given to the losing network, and (3) 
full one-way converters with conversion-generated 
benefits given to the winning network. 
In Subsection 4.1.1, we analyze third parties’ maximiza-
tion decisions on optimal converter introduction time 
and conversion option. In Subsections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, 
we present how the consumer memory effect as well as 
the price and quality levels influence third-party conver-
ter sales maximization, respectively. 
4.1.1 Introduction time and conversion option 
We explore how third parties can maximize their sales 
by deciding on converter introduction time, and on the 
                                            
2 As converters can be considered information goods, in Sha-
piro and Varian’s (1999a) broad sense, the fixed cost of pro-
ducing them may be high, while the marginal cost of 
reproducing them are low. 
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three aforementioned conversion options. For our 
numerical illustrations, the following parameter values 
are assumed: αA = 50, αB = 49, λA = 15, λB = 10, θA = 
0.25, θB = 0.75, while the other parameters depend on 
the respective analysis. For example, technology A could 
correspond to Apple’s iPod and technology B could be 
Microsoft’s Zune, in the presence of a converter C pro-
vided by a third party. For the rationale underlying the 
parameter values, we refer to Seifert and Varé (2009). 
In this analysis, we fix the values βA = βB = 0.005, D = 
1.5, γT = 0.5 and NA(0) = 0. The robustness of the fol-
lowing numerical results to derive managerial implica-
tions has also been tested. By applying all feasible 
parameter combinations within the feasible ranges αi ≥ 
0, βi > 0, λi > 0, θi ∈ [0,1] and D ≥ 1, such that pi(0) ∈ 
(0,1), qualitatively the results remain the same. Fur-
thermore, all values can be considered as normalized 
values since we use our model to describe various net-
work markets. For example, while the installed bases 
are hereby presented with multiples of hundreds, they 
may correspond to multiples of millions in reality. 
Varying the parameters T and NB(0), we observe that 
there exists an optimal introduction time T* ∈ [0,tlock,1] 





= . As an illustra-
tion, Figure 2 shows the evolution of two-way conver-
ter sales S(T) along with the introduction time T for four 
different initial installed bases NB(0). The maximum of 
each curve S(T) (i.e., the point S(T*)) occurs at a differ-
ent time T* for each initial situation and is linked to the 
abscissa by a dashed line. The same observation also 
holds with one-way converters. 
 
Figure 2. Converter sales S(T) for different installed bases NB(0) (NA(0) = 0). 
There is a relation between the optimal converter sales 
S(T*) and the size of the installed bases. For all three 
conversion options, the smaller the installed base NB(0), 
the higher the optimal converter sales S(T*) (with NA(0) 
= 0), as explicitly depicted in Figure 3. Our model then 
predicts that third parties will favor situations with both 
technologies entering the market at the same time and 
needing to create their own installed bases (i.e., NA(0) 
→ 0 and NB(0) → 0) – say a symmetric standards war. 
In such situations, the maximum sales S(T*) are higher 
and introducing converters is more profitable for third 
parties than in asymmetric standards wars, where Ni(0) 
>> Nj(0). 
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Figure 3. Optimal converter sales S(T*) as a function of NB(0). 
Therefore, we can expect that third parties tend to 
survey the technological environment and the occur-
rence of recent standards wars and thus plan converter 
introduction well in advance. For example, before the 
format war for high definition DVDs between HD-DVD 
and Blu-ray broke out – before any players or contents 
(movies, console games, etc.) had ever been produced 
with either format – Samsung and LG Electronics had 
already planned to introduce a combo HD-DVD/Blu-ray 
player. In such a case, introducing converters early may 
appeal to users of both networks who do not apparent-
ly know which technology will win the war.3 On the 
other hand, there is no reason for third parties to pros-
pect for asymmetric standards war. For example, there 
was no preannouncement of the converter introduction 
between Apple’s iPod and Microsoft’s Zune before the 
                                            
3 Samsung however had to draw back from this plan because 
of impossible licensing agreements (see Kanellos, 2006a). LG 
Electronics had indicated that such a combo player did not 
have a place in its product pipeline any more (Kanellos, 
2006b), before announcing the introduction of a player sup-
porting both formats (Ihlwan, 2007). At the same time, a new 
type of high-definition discs – Total HD Discs – has been 
created by Warner Bros, which can play films and television 
programs in both Blu-ray and HD-DVD technologies. One of 
Warner Bros’s objectives was to comply with needs of con-
fused consumers by allowing the competing formats to be put 
on separate disc layers (Siklos, 2007). 
latter portable player had been introduced. The iPod 
was already considered the market leader with a signifi-
cant majority of the market share.4 
Besides the optimal converter sales, there is also a rela-
tion between the optimal introduction time and the 
installed base sizes for each conversion option. Figure 4 
illustrates the absolute optimal introduction time T* in 
function of the installed base NB(0) (on the left side) and 






=  (on the right side). For 
two-way converters and one-way converters to the 
winning network, the optimal introduction time T* in-
creases if NB(0) increases. While T* is always early in the 
adoption process with one-way converters to the win-
ning network, T* increases towards the end of the 
adoption process with two-way converters. For one-
way converters to the losing network, the optimal in-
troduction time T* decreases if NB(0) increases, and T* 
always corresponds to tlock. 
                                            
4 Zune can import and play files from user libraries in several 
formats including MP3, WMA and Apple’s AAC, but only if 
these files are unprotected (Lombardi, 2006). In this regard, 
Zune vs. iPod still constitutes a standards war. 
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Figure 4. Absolute (left) and relative (right) optimal introduction time T* as a function of NB(0). 
Therefore, we can compare the profitability of the dif-
ferent conversion options. The converter sales S(T) with 
one-way converters designed for the winning network 
are smaller than with other converters. Users in a win-
ning network have indeed less benefits to buy a conver-
ter, as their technology will eventually lock in the 
market. For example, there is no sensible reason to give 
conversion-generated benefits only to Skype users to 
connect to competing VoIP networks, because Skype 
dominates the VoIP market. Thus, this conversion op-
tion will not be considered further. 
Either two-way converters or one-way converters to 
the losing network may coexist as strategic options. If 
the standards war is asymmetric, the maximum conver-
ter sales are equal for both conversion options (Figure 
3). If the standards war is symmetric, the maximum sales 
with two-way converters are always greater, while the 
optimal introduction time is earlier than with one-way 
converters (Figure 4). Therefore, third parties will tend 
to introduce two-way converters. In case third parties 
are not able to introduce two-way converters at the 
optimal time, they can decide to introduce one-way 
converters later to minimize the loss due to delayed 
converter introduction. 
However, introducing one-way converters is risky for 
third parties. As third parties need to plan converter 
introduction well in advance, they thus need to know 
which technology network might lose the standards 
battle. Without this information, third parties might give 
full one-way conversion benefits to the users of the 
winning technology, which would imply converter sub-
optimal adoption. Although the initial conditions of the 
competition determine the path of the technology adop-
tion process and thus the winning technology in the 
absence of converters (see Equation 2), early indicators 
might change. For example, in the next generation DVD 
market, the bias for either competing format has 
changed due to changes in strategic considerations of 
different market players. While Blu-ray was first seen as 
the potential winner, some players of the multimedia 
industry joined the HD-DVD consortium giving it a 
greater initial advantage over Blu-ray. 
Hence, major drivers for these two strategies are the 
risk aversion and time-to-market constraint. For in-
stance, if the time-to-market is significant (e.g., due to 
required converter development) third-party providers 
would be better off to aim for two-way conversion. 
These strategic options also depend on consumer 
memory effect, and on converter price and quality. 
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2009, Volume 4, Issue 2 
12 
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://www.jotmi.org) 
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios 
4.1.2 Memory effect 
There is a memory effect for consumers if there is a 
delay between the purchase of a base technology and a 
converter (modeled by parameter γ in Subsection 3.2). 
In our model, this holds for users buying converters at 
times T and tlock(T), realizing the converter introduction 
sales and the lock-in sales, respectively. Factors influenc-
ing consumer memory may be, for example, loss of 
awareness for market development or reduction of base 
technology use. That is, the longer the delay, the weaker 
the memory about converter existence (the lower the 
awareness for converter availability). Therefore, the 











≡ γγ  with tR ∈ {T, tlock(T)} 
and K ∈ [0,1] being a constant. The memory effect thus 
depends on the fraction K = γT = tlock(T). 
The consumer memory effect influences third-party 
converter sales maximization. Fixing the values of βA = 
βB = 0.005, NA(0) = 0, NB(0) = 300 and D = 1.5, the in-
fluence of γT (or γtlock(T)) on the optimal converter sales 
S(T*) and on the optimal converter introduction time T* 
is shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Influence of memory factor on optimal sales (left) and introduction time (right). 
 
We can distinguish two different zones for low and for 
high values of γT (on each side of γT = 0.3 in Figure 5). 
For low values of γT (high awareness), the optimal con-
verter sales are higher and the optimal introduction 
time is later. For high values of γT (low awareness), the 
optimal converter sales are smaller and the optimal 
introduction time is earlier in the adoption process. 
Therefore, third parties can delay converter introduc-
tion towards the end of the technology adoption proc-
ess and capture more sales when consumer awareness 
for the conversion issue is relatively high. For example, 
in the classic standards battle in the microcomputer 
industry, conversion software had emerged only at the 
end of the technology adoption process (when IBM-
compatible computers were considered to have won 
the race over Macintoshes). The awareness was high as 
almost every consumer knew the problems related to 
computer interoperability. 
One way to influence consumer memory effect is re-
lated to the marketing efforts of third parties. Indeed, 
there is a trade-off for third parties given the relation 
between maximum converter sales and marketing ef-
forts: The maximum sales may be higher with a one-way 
converter and high awareness than with a two-way 
converter and low awareness. Therefore, a change of 
marketing efforts can change the optimal conversion 
option. 
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4.1.3 Effect of converter price and quality 
Converter price and quality are included in the disutility 
parameter D (see Subsection 3.2). Therefore, they also 
influence converter sales maximization. Independently 
from the time of introduction, the higher D the lower 
the sales.  
There is another trade-off between D and the memory 
effect, since they are related in the definition of the 
disutility. Indeed, weak consumer memory can be com-
pensated by high converter quality and low converter 
price. Figure 6 presents the influence of the memory γT 
or γtlock(T) on the optimal converter sales S(T*) for sev-
eral values of D. 
 
Figure 6. Influence of converter price and quality (D) on optimal converter sales. 
 
For all values γT, the maximum converter sales are 
greater for low D (converters with high quality and low 
price) than for high D. Therefore, the same level of sales 
can be reached with low awareness γT and low disutility 
parameter D as with high awareness and high disutility. 
4.2 Effects of third-party converters on adoption 
process of base technologies 
Having identified how third parties can maximize their 
sales, we analyze how third-party converter introduc-
tion directly impacts the adoption process of competing 
base technologies. Converter introduction interferes 
with the standards war by modifying the lock-in process 
of the base technologies. When converters are not 
available, one competing technology locks in the market 
at time tlock,1. In the presence of third-party converters, 
competing technologies lock in at time tlock(T), which 
may be different from tlock,1 as being dependent on the 
introduction time T. 
For all values of introduction time T ∈ [0, tlock,1), we find 
that a dominant effect on the lock-in process of incom-
patible, competing base technologies in the presence of 
third-party converters is process acceleration. Accelera-
tion of the lock-in process occurs if one competing 
technology locks in the market in the presence of con-
verters earlier than when converters are not available, 
i.e., if tlock(T) < tlock,1. Figure 7 shows the relative accelera-







, as a func-
tion of T for different initial situations with one-way 
converters for losing technology users (on the left side) 
and two-way converters (on the right side). The differ-
ent functions represent a measure of the intensity of 
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acceleration. For one-way as well as for two-way con-
verters, the earlier the converter introduction, the 
greater the intensity of acceleration on the lock-in 
process of competing technologies. 
 
Figure 7. Relative acceleration of lock-in process with one-way (left) and two-way converters (right). 
There may be rare exceptions to acceleration where 
the lock-in process gets extended. This holds only for 
impractical parameter values with one product charac-
teristic close to 0. Yet, in our model setting, there is a 
fundamental variation between third-party and incum-
bent-provided converters: While incumbent-provided 
converters may accelerate, extend or reverse the lock-
in process in every configuration depending on the in-
troduction time (see Seifert and Varé, 2009), third-party 
converters most prominently accelerate it. One reason 
is that third parties do not manipulate the degrees of 
conversion by allowing for conversion options with 
partial compatibility, as they are independent from in-
cumbents’ business and always seek to maximize total 
converter sales. Even if third parties tried to extend the 
lock-in process by allowing for partial compatibility, full 
conversion would always capture more sales. 
The intensity of acceleration on the lock-in process 
directly impacts incumbents’ business by changing the 
market share level reached at the lock-in time. Figure 8 
shows how the market share at time tlock(T) may change 
along with the introduction time T (in a symmetric stan-
dards war as an example). The higher the intensity, the 
lower the market shares for dominant incumbents (the 
higher the market share for weak incumbents). The 
analysis is similar for one-way as well as for two-way 
converters. 
 
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2009, Volume 4, Issue 2 
15 
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://www.jotmi.org) 
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios 
 
Figure 8. Effects of third-party converter introduction on market share. 
The intensity of acceleration and the implications for 
market share would be experienced differently depend-
ing on the memory effect. If consumer awareness is 
high, third-party converters are optimally introduced at 
the end of the adoption process and thus the intensity 
of acceleration is low. If awareness is low, converters 
are introduced early in the adoption process, when the 
intensity of acceleration is strong. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the impact of acceleration on the adoption 
process of base technologies and distinguishes whether 
consumer awareness is low or high, and whether in-
cumbents are dominant or weak (up and down arrows 
meaning positive and negative, respectively). 
 
Table 1. Impact of acceleration on incumbents related to third parties’ strategies. 
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For dominant incumbents, converter introduction with 
high awareness has a low impact, as they are introduced 
at the end of the process. With low awareness, the 
dominant technology locks in the market earlier. This 
strengthens the dominant position in the market. How-
ever, the premature lock-in gives less time to plan and 
pursue further projects like upgrading actual products 
or developing new products, in order to keep this posi-
tion. It also shortens the product life cycle and time to 
market in new product developments. Likewise, less 
market share at the lock-in time gives them less possibil-
ity to introduce new products. For example, in the 
video game market, none of the dominant firms in each 
console generation could prevent innovations from 
competitors and stay the market leader. Gallagher and 
Park (2002) show the circumstances under which Nin-
tendo, Sega and Sony have respectively succeeded to 
each other as the dominant player in this market be-
tween the third and fifth generations. Furthermore, 
after having set the de facto standard thanks to con-
verters earlier, dominant incumbents have to face the 
entry of small firms competing as early imitators. This is 
referred to as the “pesky little brothers” by Besen and 
Farrell (1994), the dominant incumbents being the “big 
brothers.” These small firms would enter later in the 
absence of converters. 
For weak incumbents, converter introduction paired 
with strong memory does not provide much help to 
fight out the standards war, even though losing technol-
ogy users receive conversion-generated benefits. Con-
verter introduction with weak memory may increase 
the utility for future users, but the market is neverthe-
less locked in earlier. This implies less sales and less 
time to strategically re-position by planning further 
projects or by gaining an installed base in a defined niche 
market, although the higher level of market share rises 
the potential to keep current users in the market niche. 
For example, the market share of Macintoshes has con-
stantly decreased since the lock-in of the microcom-
puter market by IBM-compatible PCs (Reimer, 2005), 
demonstrating the difficulty of weak incumbents despite 
the availability of conversion. Likewise, de Vries and 
Hendrikse (2001) show that the weak incumbent in the 
Dutch banking chipcard industry had to withdraw its 
chipcard system from the market even after a two-way 
converter introduction. The weak incumbent had no 
other solution than coming back with a compatible 
solution with the dominant incumbent, at the cost of 
money and time. 
Therefore, although third-party converters may comply 
with some consumer needs (above all with losing tech-
nology users), they have negative effects on weak in-
cumbents as well as on dominant incumbents. 
4.3 Incumbents' reaction and anticipation strate-
gies 
In network markets, incumbents try to set their prod-
ucts as de facto standards. As third-party converter 
introductions cannot be avoided by incumbents and 
have effects on the adoption process of base technolo-
gies, they represent a constraint for incumbents to 
reach their objective. This is particularly true, as third 
parties seek to maximize total converter sales. 
In this subsection, we discuss anticipation and reaction 
strategies of incumbents to reduce this constraint. We 
distinguish between general strategies in de facto stan-
dardization processes (Subsection 4.3.1) and specific 
reaction strategies to third-party converter introduc-
tion. (Subsection 4.3.2). We show that incumbents are 
able to reduce third parties’ incentive to introduce con-
verters by taking actions, which should be integral to 
the overall strategies to establish a technology as the de 
facto standard. 
4.3.1 Strategies in de facto standardization 
processes 
Ehrhardt (2004) has developed a framework for analyz-
ing strategies of companies in de facto standardization 
processes. In order to anticipate third-party converter 
provision, incumbents can take advantage of this frame-
work to successfully establish their base technologies, 
by using tactics within positioning strategies and strate-
gies for building an installed base. These tactics reduce 
the potential of third parties to become successful and 
thus obstruct possible converter introduction. 
Accessibility strategy: Following Ehrhardt (2004), 
positioning strategies are based on two criteria: The 
leadership decision and the access decision. Leadership 
refers to incumbents’ development of an own standard 
or adoption of an existing standard. Access regards 
incumbents’ choice of whether to set their technology 
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as proprietary or as open standard. The anticipation of a 
converter introduction directly relates to the access 
decision. 
If incumbents decide to design a proprietary standard, 
they will make their system less accessible to their 
competitors as well as to third parties providing conver-
ters. They may either completely restrict access to third 
parties or agree on high-level licensing fees, which 
create entry barriers for third parties. If incumbents 
decide to set their technology as an open standard, 
access is, by definition, allowed to third parties (they 
may sometimes charge low licensing fees). 
In addition to the entry barriers due to inaccessibility or 
high fees, third parties need to access two different 
networks to develop a converter. If at least one net-
work is proprietary, third parties’ incentive to produce 
converters is reduced. With two open networks, the 
incentive would already be reduced, as any entity should 
be able to produce converters. 
Inaccessibility to networks might decrease converter 
quality – and especially the degrees of conversion – and 
increase converter price. Furthermore, in the first case 
of inaccessibility, the time to develop converters might 
be longer for third parties. They might thus not be able 
to introduce their converters at the optimal introduc-
tion time. 
Therefore, incumbents should keep their networks as 
closed as possible to third parties, to reduce third par-
ties’ interest in developing converters. For example, in 
the standards wars in the high-definition DVD market, 
both incumbents (HD DVD and Blu-ray) have kept their 
network completely closed. This action allowed them to 
hinder LG to introduce a combo player at the beginning 
of the standards war, which would have implied profit 
maximization. Likewise, Samsung withdrew a similar 
project later due to loss of incentive to introduce it. 
Such a measure may affect third parties’ strategies. If the 
optimal introduction time is at the beginning of the 
adoption process, third parties may, for example, in-
crease their marketing efforts to delay the introduction 
time, and to reduce the effect of closed networks. 
Installed base creation: Strategies for building an 
installed base are relevant in de facto standardization 
processes as the early market phase determines which 
technology will win the standards war. Moreover, third 
parties favor symmetric standards wars to introduce 
converters. Therefore, if incumbents put efforts into 
creating an installed base, not only do they give them-
selves competitive advantages in the standards war, but 
they also build entry barriers for third parties. 
Such efforts can be done by following strategies which 
will increase the network effects, like ensuring the pro-
vision of complementary products, penetration pricing 
or preannouncing market introduction of new products 
(Besen and Farrell, 1994; Ehrhardt, 2004). These efforts 
should increase the asymmetry between the installed 
bases. This implies a reduced potential to sell third-party 
converters. 
Moreover, it is not only important for an incumbent to 
build an installed base faster than its competitors, but all 
incumbents also have to build their respective installed 
bases before third parties introduce converters. 
4.3.2 Reaction strategies to third-party converter 
introduction 
In addition to general strategies to establish a product as 
the de facto standard, some strategic options can be 
considered by incumbents to directly react to third-
party converter introductions. Incumbents may develop 
their own converter or may influence consumer percep-
tion of degrees of conversion. 
Incumbent-provided converters: By developing 
their own built-in converter, incumbents will control 
converter adoption by customers, as each customer 
buying the respective base technology will buy a conver-
ter at the same time. This reduces the potential sales of 
third-party converters as consumers buying a base tech-
nology including a built-in converter do not need to 
possess two converters. 
Therefore, this strategic option can reduce the incentive 
of third parties to sell converters. Third parties may 
need to revise their strategy, by taking new measures so 
that the optimal introduction time falls at a later point in 
time to avoid the incumbents’ reaction. 
However, there may also be a game between the in-
cumbents about which one has to produce converters. 
 
18 
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://www.jotmi.org) 
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios 
The result from this game could be that none of the 
incumbents are ready, from a strategic perspective, to 
introduce built-in converters. 
Influence on consumer perception: As well as using 
tactics to influence consumer perception to adopt a 
base technology in de facto standardization processes 
(see a review of these tactics by Varé and Seifert, 2008), 
incumbents may influence consumer acceptance for 
third-party converters. By discrediting converters, in-
cumbents can try to influence consumers’ adoption 
willingness so that the perceived degrees of conversion 
are lower than the effective technical degrees of con-
version. This decreases consumer utility for third-party 
converters. 
Incumbents may also influence consumer memory with 
marketing measures. They may confuse consumers 
about converter functionality. For example, consumer 
confusion was a cause of Philips’ failure to set the DCC 
(Digital Compact Cassette) technology as a standard 
(Hill, 1997). 
With this strategic option, incumbents discourage third 
parties to provide converters in their market, as the 
action decreases the potential converter sales. As a 
consequence, third parties’ strategic plans need to be 
changed or re-adjusted. As this option affects converter 
sales over time, third parties might need to re-schedule 
converter introduction to an earlier point in time. In the 
example of the standards war for the new generation of 
DVDs, the incumbents could not avoid the introduction 
of LG’s combo player, but forced LG to adapt its strate-
gy. For example, LG needed to increase its marketing 
efforts to avoid consumers’ misperceptions, and to 
make clear that its player brings clear benefits. Likewise, 
by acting against LG, the incumbents avoid the entry of 
other third parties into the converter market. 
5. Conclusion 
In network markets, the provision of third-party con-
verters is an important specification of standards wars 
for incumbents. In this paper, we analyzed the effects of 
third-party converter introduction on the adoption 
process of incumbents’ base technologies. We devel-
oped a mathematical model for the conditional adoption 
of third-party converters in an adoption process of 
incompatible base technologies. We determined and 
discussed converter introduction strategies of third 
parties by establishing under what circumstances they 
maximize their profit, what the effects of third-party 
converters are on the adoption process of base tech-
nologies, and how incumbents can anticipate and react 
to third-party converter introduction. 
We found that there is always an optimal time for third-
party converter introduction such that converter sales 
are maximized. This time depends on the conversion 
option and consumer memory effect related to conver-
ter availability. Third parties prefer symmetric standards 
wars (both base technologies are introduced at the 
same time) from the outset because they have a greater 
potential of sales. They also favor full two-way conver-
ters as a conversion option to avoid the risk of develop-
ing one-way converters to the winning technology – 
which implies converter suboptimal adoption. 
Third-party converter introduction most prominently 
results in an acceleration of the lock-in process of the 
base dominant technologies. As a consequence of this 
acceleration, converters have negative effects on weak 
incumbents (loss of time to re-position) as well as on 
dominant incumbents (loss of time to upgrade or devel-
op new products). 
To reduce the constraint due to third-party converter 
introduction, incumbents have a series of strategic op-
tions at their disposal. By keeping their network closed, 
creating an installed base early, developing their own 
built-in converter and/or influencing consumer percep-
tion of converters, incumbents reduce the sales poten-
tial of third-party converters and they reduce third 
parties’ interests in developing and introducing conver-
ters. For example, Apple Computer has been able to 
protect the iPod network from legal conversion provid-
ers so far. 
Promising areas for further research remain: There is a 
need for empirical research on recent standards wars 
like in the markets of high-definition DVDs, the new 
generation of video game consoles, or portable multi-
media players. This research could show evidence about 
the interdependence between third parties and incum-
bents in the long run. The coexistence of incumbent-
provided and third-party converters in the market might 
be studied, highlighting the effects on incumbents’ and 
third parties’ businesses. Another interesting area in 
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terms of market creation is the sequence of introducing 
new products after converter introduction because of 
the effects of converters on the lock-in process. Finally, 
while we have studied the impact of third-party conver-
ters from the incumbents’ point of view, a study of so-
cial welfare could help policy makers in their analyses 
and decisions concerning markets regulation while in 
presence of market-driven standards setting processes. 
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